Increased public concern about safety issues and stringent environmental standards has led plant designers to consider inherently safer design. The term 'inherently safer' implies that the process is safe by its very nature and not externally constrained to be safe by the use of add-on systems and devices. Such opportunities for developing inherently safer process are highest in the early stages of design. Constraints such as time, lack of knowledge and inadequate inherent safety analysis tools are often cited as obstacles to development and implementation of inherently safer design. In this paper, we describe an inherent safety analysis methodology that can be applied in the early stages of process development. The methodology is based on an inherent safety index for comparing process routes and heuristics for identifying hazards and generating alternative designs. This methodology has been implemented as one module in iSafe, an intelligent system that automates inherent safety analysis. One key benefit of iSafe is substantial reduction in the time and effort required to perform safety analysis. Automation of the inherent safety analysis also makes it more thorough and detailed, minimizes or eliminates human errors, facilitates documentation and makes the study results available online for detailed safety analysis and review in the later stages of process design. The details of inherent safety analysis at the route selection stage are discussed in this paper and illustrated by comparing competing processes for acetic acid manufacture.
Introduction
In recent years, the risks posed by chemical industries to life, property and environment has significantly increased due to many reasons: increased population density near industrial complexes, size of operation, complexity, and use of extreme operating conditions. This has led to the development and use of better hazard identification and analysis techniques like FMEA, QRA, HAZOP, etc. which try to reduce the frequency and consequences of accidents. Such safety analyses at later stages complicate the design and prompt additional costs. Estimates show that in the oil and chemical industries, 15-30% of capital cost is now spent on such safety and pollution prevention measures [1] . This has challenged chemical industries to develop processes that are inherently safer, environmentally friendlier, simpler, and more cost effective.
An inherently safer process avoids or reduces hazards instead of controlling them. It relies on naturally occurring phenomena and robust design and eliminates or greatly reduces the need for instrumentation or administrative controls, thereby reducing the costs related to safety and environment. This is normally accomplished by application of inherent safety principles throughout the design process, from conception until completion. Examples of the principles are intensification, substitution, attenuation, limitation of effects, simplification, etc. These principles help avoid or reduce hazards by using safer materials and operating conditions, minimizing inventory, and by designing a simpler and friendlier plant. Opportunities for identification and development of inherently safer process alternatives for solvents, reaction paths, catalyst, etc. are high during the early design stages. Decisions made during early design stages concerning the choice of a synthesis route for a product, location for manufacture, and throughput are crucial and fix 80% of capital cost [2] . The benefits realized by industrial application of inherent safety concepts have been discussed by several authors [3] [4] [5] and include improved public image, reduced life-cycle cost, improved productivity, increased reliability, reduced company liabilities, and improved safety and environmental performance. Despite the obvious importance of inherently safer design, there has only been limited work on development of support tools for inherent safety analysis.
We have developed an intelligent design support system, called iSafe, for performing inherent safety analysis during early stages of design. iSafe identifies hazardous issues and proposes inherently safer alternatives to eliminate or reduce them. While iSafe can be used throughout the design life-cycle, the focus in this paper is on the route selection stage, specifically, ranking competing routes from the safety perspective. The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, an overview of process design and inherent safety is presented. In Section 3, we illustrate the index and heuristics based approaches implemented in iSafe for evaluating processes using the example of competing acetic acid processes. Conclusions from this study are presented in Section 4.
Process design and inherent safety
A process goes through various stages of evolution, including research, process development, design, construction, operation, maintenance, modifications, and finally, decommissioning. An inherently safer process design and development methodology involves iterative application of chemical engineering and inherent safety principles at each decision point along the process life-cycle. The key decision points include: (1) product specification; (2) synthesis route selection; (3) flowsheet development; (4) conceptual design; (5) detailed engineering; and (6) construction and commissioning. Traditional process design addresses specific issues one at a time and revisions are made to the design, as constraints and opportunities are recognized. Cost of the product and raw material and process yield are some of the metrics used at early stages to screen routes for a specific product. Safety usually plays a passive role and acts as a verification criterion for the final design. The shift from traditional sequential design to concurrent design has contributed to the adoption of inherent safety measures for hazard elimination or reduction instead of risk reduction through addition of layers of protection.
Screening of process routes is critical for inherently safer design. In order to rank process routes at early stages, Edwards and Lawrence [6] developed an index, called prototype index for inherent safety (PIIS), based on parameters that influence inherent safety of a process route. A low value of index means high degree of inherent safety. One key drawback of PIIS is that it concentrates on reactions and does not consider other process aspects. Heikkila [7] overcame this by considering a wider range of factors affecting the inherent safety of the process in the inherent safety index (ISI). ISI accounts for process safety structure, side reactions, corrosiveness, chemical interaction, type of equipment, and inventory based on annual throughput instead of yield. It is thus applicable to both route selection and flowsheet stages. An index serves as a yardstick that reflects change in magnitude and direction of individual hazards due to changes made to the process. It also serves as a guide for the design team to set priorities for further design work. The index calculation is not sufficient in itself to make a decision on the choice of a process route. Detailed inherent safety analysis of each process routes is necessary to identify hazards and alternatives to rectify them.
A review of the status of inherently safer process design in the UK conducted by Health and Safety Executive resulted in the European Community co-funded project, called INSIDE, to develop tools and methodologies for systematic application of inherent safety [8] . The INSIDE project resulted in the development of a paper-based tool-kit, called INSET, which facilitates the application of inherent safety principles along the process life-cycle. Despite the growing interest and obvious importance of inherently safer design, its adoption into practice has been slow. The main barriers for adoption of inherently safer approaches are time and cost pressures on project that do not allow for systematic study of alternatives during the early stages, conservatism in design and management, lack of awareness and lack of support tools [8] [9] [10] . Rushton et al. [11] emphasized the need for a computer aid that will perform comprehensive inherent safety analysis at each key decision point in the process life. The key benefits of automation are substantial reduction in time and effort, enhanced decision-making, improved documentation, and better understanding of the process. Towards this, we have developed an intelligent design support tool, called iSafe, that automates inherent safety analysis during early stages of design [12, 13] . iSafe can rank competing process routes using an inherent safety index and also assist the designer identify safety issues and design alternatives during the different stages of the design life-cycle. The methodology implemented in iSafe for analyzing process routes is explained in the next section and illustrated using competing acetic acid processes.
Inherent safety analysis of process routes using i i iSafe
Process route selection is the heart of the design process. During this stage, the process configuration-reactor, separation units, and the need for recycle-and thus the raw materials, byproducts, intermediates, catalysts and the reaction conditions are determined. The inherent process hazards are thus largely fixed during this stage. iSafe identifies the hazards that are associated with the reactions and the chemicals involved in the process route and ranks the available process routes for the product chosen in the product specification stage. Information used for analysis are reaction conditions, materials involved, heat of reaction, catalysts, phase of reaction, unit process involved, and process yield. Examples of unit processes include chlorination, nitration, oxidation, carbonylation, polymerization, etc. Process routes available for manufacture of a chemical can be ranked using inherent safety indices. iSafe's route index is based on the scoring pattern used in ISI [7] which enables uniformity in index values across design stages.
Index calculation for acetic acid process routes
The application of iSafe is illustrated through the comparison of ten different acetic acid process routes [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] in this section. The reactions involved in each process route along with the information used for the inherent safety analysis are shown in Table 1 . The index for individual route options was calculated and safety issues associated with the processes and inherently safer alternatives to reduce hazards were identified using iSafe. The index calculation methodology is illustrated for the low-pressure carbonylation process in Tables 2 and 3 . The overall safety index (OSI) accounts for the hazards due to the chemicals in a process route and reaction conditions. The OSI does not take into account safety issues related to factors such as: (1) phase of reaction; (2) use of catalyst and solvent; (3) phase generation; (4) byproduct formation; (5) auto-ignition; (6) decomposition; and (7) type of unit process involved in the chemistry. The individual chemical index (ICI) characterizes each chemical involved in a route whereas the individual reaction index (IRI) characterizes reaction. Scores for calculating sub-indices involved in calculation of ICI and IRI are taken from Heikkila's ISI [7] except for the process yield index, which is from Edwards and Lawrence's PIIS [6] . During early design stages, information of inventory is usually lacking and reaction yield can be used as a measure of inventory since higher yield results in reduction in the size of reactors and recycles. Scores for flammability index and process yield index are shown in Tables 4  and 5 , respectively. The indices calculated by iSafe for each route is shown in Table 6 . The overall reaction index (ORI) characterizes the hazardous conditions in the process route. The ORI for a process route is high when it involves large number of main reactions. Therefore, a route with a smaller number of reactors (corresponding to a few main reactions) is preferred over one with many. This will help in focusing on the reduction of inventory of hazardous chemicals and elimination of hazardous reactions. The hazardous chemical index (HCI) and the hazardous reaction index (HRI) are indicators of the most hazardous chemical and reaction in the process route. The value of HCI and HRI will be same as ORI and OCI if there is only one reaction in the route.
The method of calculating OSI does not differentiate between routes based on the number of chemicals or reactions and their hazardous properties. We overcome this limitation by introducing three additional supplementary indicesworst chemical index (WCI), worst reaction index (WRI), and total chemical index (TCI). The WCI is the summation of maximum values of the flammability, toxicity, reactivity, and explosiveness indices of all the materials involved in a 1 + 4 + 4 + 3 (see Table 3 ) 1 2
Worst reaction index WRI max(R t ) + max(R p ) + max(R y ) + max(R h )
Total chemical index TCI ICI 8 + 7 + 10 (see Table 3 ) 2 5
N r : NFPA reactivity rating; N f : flammability index; N t : toxicity index; N e : explosiveness index, R t : temperature sub-index; R p : pressure sub-index; R y : yield sub-index; R h : heat of reaction sub-index. Based on the index calculation, it can be concluded that ethanol oxidation is the inherently safer route and methane oxidation the most hazardous one. The methane oxidation Table 4 Heuristics for flammable nature and index calculation [7] Condition route is a two-step process while the others are single-step processes. By comparing the OSI values, the methane oxidation process can be concluded to be the most hazardous one. The OSI values for the low-pressure carbonylation, Acetaldehyde oxidation, Halcon vapor phase oxidation, high-pressure carbonylation and butane oxidation are close to each other. The OSI for the low-pressure carbonylation process is lower than that of the Halcon vapor phase oxidation process while the low-pressure carbonylation process' TCI is higher. The higher TCI for the low-pressure carbonylation process is due to the use of a large number of hazardous chemicals. Since the WCI of these two processes are the same and information on inventory of each Table 5 Heuristics for process yield index calculation [6] Process yield (%) Score hazardous chemical in the process is not available during this stage, their WRI are compared which reveals that the low-pressure carbonylation process is inherently safer. Similarly, processes can be ranked based on worst possible combination of reaction conditions using WRI. Since the low-pressure carbonylation process involves one main reaction, values of IRI, HRI, and WRI are equal.
Hazard identification and alternative generation for acetic acid processes
While the inherent safety index provides a quantitative perspective, a qualitative perspective can reveal specific safety issues associated with a route, which can then be eliminated by using alternate safer design options. iSafe can automatically identify safety issues and suggest alternative designs. These are identified by iSafe using heuristics based on inherent safety principles. A part of the heuristics used during the route selection stage is shown in Table 7 . The inherent hazards related to materials are identified based on their physical, toxicological, chemical, and reactive properties. A material is concluded to be hazardous if it is flammable, carcinogenic, teratogenic, mutagenic, water reactive, unstable, pyrophoric, corrosive, toxic, or explosive. For example, toxic carbon monoxide involved in the low-pressure carbonylation route and flammable ethylene involved in the Halcon vapor phase oxidation process are concluded as hazardous. Alternatives such as "use safer material" and "modify hazardous material into less hazardous form" are suggested for a hazardous product to minimize or eliminate hazards. The phase of a reaction influences the dispersion characteristics in case of leak in the reactor system. For liquid phase reactions like lowand high-pressure carbonylation processes, the use of vapor phase can be recommended. This is because the mass of material released for the same volume is smaller compared to liquid phase under the same conditions. Waste products from reactions need to be reduced in order to reduce wastage of raw materials and decrease the reactor size required for the same throughput. If a material produced in the reaction is a byproduct then "improve process yield" is proposed as an alternative. Improvement of yield is thus proposed for the Huels butene oxidation process. The use of catalysts may increase yield and allow reactions to be carried out at safer conditions. Therefore, if a process is non-catalytic and yield is low then use of a catalytic process is proposed. In the case of Huels butene oxidation process with low yield, change of catalyst to improve yield is suggested. Catalysts can be a hazard by themselves. For example, commonly used heavy metal catalysts are potentially poisonous. The hazards related to catalysts and solvents used in the reaction are evaluated similar to other materials. Heuristics are also used to identify hazards associated with common unit processes. Possibility of explosion in the ethylene oxidation process is identified due to handling of oxygen and flammable materials and possibility of thermal runaway due to exothermic reaction in the case of high-pressure carbonylation are highlighted.
Additional information about the process hazards generated during the index calculation can be supplemented with additional heuristics to diagnose hazards and suggest alternatives. The premise underlying the index-based issue identification is that any sub-index value greater than one is considered hazardous and an alternative has to be explored. For example, if the process yield index is greater than one, then low process yield is highlighted as an issue, and "improve process yield" is suggested as an alternative. Issues such as the use of extreme operating conditions and release of large amount of heat are identified. Inherently safer alternatives to minimize them such as "look for safer process chemistry", "use safer operating conditions", and "use high yield process" can then be proposed. High-pressure carbonylation route is assigned a higher ORI due to the extreme reaction conditions when compared to the low-pressure carbonylation route. "Use of low pressure" is recommended for high-pressure carbonylation process and "use of vapor phase reaction" is recommended for liquid phase carbonylation process. The ethanol oxidation route is identified to be the inherently safest route as it involves milder conditions and safer chemicals when compared to the other routes. Sample results from the qualitative analysis of the Halcon vapor phase process are shown in Table 8 . Due to the space constraints, the complete results for the other processes are not presented here and the reader is referred to Palaniappan [19] .
Conclusions
Integration of safety analysis at each design stage is vital for chemical process industries. In this paper, we have described a systematic methodology for inherent safety analysis during route selection stage and illustrated it using different processes for producing acetic acid. This methodology has been implemented as one of the modules in iSafe, an intelligent system that automates inherent safety analysis. Other modules in iSafe perform safety analysis during product specification stage and flowsheet development. The 'generic' nature of the methodology in iSafe enables it to be applicable to a variety of processes. This has been established by testing it on several case studies including acrylic acid flowsheet development and phenol production process routes. iSafe is envisioned to assist plant designers in developing an inherently safer chemical process. Specifically, it would increase the awareness of the design team regarding downstream safety consequences of early decisions on the final design, facilitate fast track prototyping, and reduce the time and effort spent in safety analysis at later stages. It could thus form a part of concurrent engineering support tools for process design. iSafe can also be linked to a database of real-life cases that provide specific examples of inherently safer design and illustrate the synergies and tradeoffs between safety, health, environmental aspects, economics, and the operability of a chemical plant. We are currently developing such as database to complement iSafe.
